This is the good news: German Chancellor Angela Merkel has emerged as one of the strongest advocates of Israeli security of any European head of state in recent years.
After Germany assumed leadership of the European Union and the Group of Eight in January, Chancellor Merkel revived the Mideast Quartet (the U.S., the EU, Russia and the UN) to bring movement into the nearly defunct Mideast peace process. In early April, on her second visit to the Mideast in two months, Chancellor Merkel warned Iran to stop threatening Israel, made abundantly clear her abhorrence for terrorism, and refused to meet with Palestinian officials who are members or supporters of Hamas.
This is the worrisome news: A Global Scan poll commissioned by the BBC in March 2007, determined that 77 percent of Germans believe that Israel has a negative impact on world affairs. In fact, only 10 percent of Germans believe Israel has a positive impact, scantly more than the new European Union member countries Poland and Hungary.
This discouraging information came just weeks after results were released of an extensive survey taken by the Bertelsmann Foundation on German-Israeli relations and Jewish issues. One out of every two Germans no longer believes that the country has a special responsibility to the Jews; among those under 30, 55 percent. Interestingly, while 78 percent of Israelis believe in a special German responsibility, the number drops to 41 percent in the American Jewish community, which was also polled.
Conversely, Israelis hold a far more positive image of Germans, with 57 percent hoping for a larger influence of Germany within Europe. According to a survey released in February 2007, by the Jerusalem office of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, an even higher number, 67 percent of Israelis, hold a positive opinion of Germany.
While the poll results in Israel show that the decades of close links between Germany and Israel have had an impact, it is nonetheless clear that times are changing in Germany. More than half a century after the Holocaust, many in Germany are demanding closure to moral debts from the Nazi era. There is a reexamination underway regarding German suffering during the war. From the eastern half of Germany, some public officials are demanding that victims of communism receive treatment equal to that of Holocaust victims, in terms of financial compensation and societal recognition. With increasing distance in time to the Holocaust, some ask what this has to do with me, as does the proverbial fourth son in the Passover Haggadah. This question has taken on additional relevance in a country where one out of four new students is of non-German heritage.
The question is when these quiet but discernable shifts in historical perspective will have an impact in Germany on foreign policy, particularly regarding Israel. Despite Chancellor Merkel’s eloquent acceptance of eternal German responsibility for the past during her April visit in Israel, as well as a similar statement by German Cardinal Karl Lehmann, polls are showing a considerable gap between public opinion and public policy.
The growing divide comes at a time when Germany is enjoying rising political influence, both within Eastern Europe, to which it is linked by traditional trade and cultural ties, as well as within the European political sphere. Germany is flexing some newfound political muscles at a moment when the U.S. and Israel have taken a beating in public perception, due in particular to the conduct and aftermath of the wars in Iraq and Lebanon, respectively.
It is hardly surprising that this has proven a propitious moment for a discussion of the so-called “Israel Lobby.” German reporters in the U.S. seized all too gladly on a New York Times article in February 2006, discussing the impact of Indiana University Professor Alvin Rosenfeld’s essay, “Progressive Jewish Thought and the New Antisemitism,” published on the AJC website. The New York Times article prompted a number of German reporters to write about the debate over the essay. Some reporters used the discussion as supposed proof of an all-powerful Jewish pro-Israel lobby in the U.S. that squelches all criticism of Israel.
In Germany, some Jewish critics of Israel seem to have discovered their Jewish roots as a useful tool for criticizing Israel, acting as Jewish crown witnesses for the European left. They thereby ease the consciences of others, who claim that they are prevented by the so-called Israel Lobby from expressing their true opinion of Israel.
For decades, journalists, politicians and policy experts in Germany have not held back on criticism of Israel, particularly since the 1967 war and the occupation of territories. What is different about the current discussion is that the historical framework has changed. The challenge is to find new ways to address mutual challenges, such as terrorism, the threat of totalitarian regimes such as Iran, regional instability and fundamentalism in the Islamic world. These are not Israel’s problems alone but security risks for the Western world.
Together, the U.S. and Germany can be even stronger partners in pushing forward the transatlantic alliance to work with – and not against – Israel. The greater the partnership and cooperation with Israel, the more likely it is that there will be a favorable shift in public opinion. Chancellor Merkel’s most recent trip to Israel gives room to hope that her administration will approach this challenge with the necessary creativity and determination.
I’m affraid there are even other factors at play that may force Merkel to take a more neutral stance on Israel.
I admire Merkel for her broadly Realist approach to foreign affairs.
But because of this same, reasoning she may decide that the Israel cause is more counter-productive than fruitful to Germany.
Germany has important neighbours taking more clear cut approaches to dealing with Israel.
On one hand we have Russia, that through its Arab ties and military technology rivalry, does not favour Israel at all.
If we think that Russia has great influence in Germany due to its gas exports and geopolitical influence in eastern Europe, we’ll see that Germany needs to tread carefully with Mother Russia.
On the other hand we have Poland. A preferential market by nature, Poland also controls many pipelines heading to Germany.
Poland because of its alliance with the US and groing hotility towards Russia will always be favourable to Israel.
Something Germany should take into account.
Finally we have France. If in general terms France is somewhat pro-Israel, in its areas of influence such as Lebanon, France may be forced to take an anti Israel stance.
France is lets say the swing vote in Germany’s foreign policy.
Angela Merkel may be forced to abandon Israel in a time of need if both Russia and France rally against the Hebrew state.
The USA and eastern Europe may not be enough to hold Germany to its Israeliphilia…
The gap between public opinion and public policy already leads to the reappearance of anti-semitic clichées such as that the government is controlled by a jewish-zionist conspiracy of elitists. It also shows that the public debate about the historical role of Germany in the past has failed in Germany. It seems that the more the Germans know about their history the more they deny their responsibility. All this prooves that Adorno and Horkheimer were right with their pessimistic vision of a Negative Enlightment (”Dialectic of Enlightenment”: Philosophical Fragments. Stanford, Cal.:Stanford University Press, 2002.)